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1 Introduction
Modern large companies have two typical features: separation of ownership and man-
agement, which was observed by Berle and Means (1932), and limited liability. Sep-
aration of ownership and management allows rms to commit to behavior other than
prot-maximizing behavior. Certain empirical evidence implies that they do not be-
have as prot-maximizers. For example, Amihud and Kamin (1979) supported \Baumol
(1958)'s hypothesis that revenue-maximizing behavior is more prevalent among oligopolis-
tic, management-controlled rms ". From a managerial incentive perspective, Vickers
(1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) theoretically justied this empirical evidence.
Vickers (1985) established that rms may obtain higher prots by delegating to man-
agers who do not behave as prot-maximizers. Fershtman and Judd (1987) examined the
incentives that owners of competing rms in an oligopoly give managers as compensation,
inducing the managers to maximize linear combinations of the objectives of prots and
sales. These authors explored both how competing owners may strategically manipulate
these incentive contracts and the resulting impact on the oligopoly equilibrium outcome.
Fershtman and Judd (1987) showed that owners of duopolistic rms always give more
incentives weighted to sales than those weighted to prot if costs are suciently low at
the equilibrium and that while this equilibrium output of each rm exceeds the Cournot
output, both prot and price are lower than in the Cournot equilibrium. 1. These works
have motived a large amount of research concerning strategic delegation 2.
The other feature (limited liability) is adopted by modern large companies. According
to Spulber (2009, pp. 264{65), corporations, which can be regarded as limited liability
companies, earn almost 85% of the total revenue a year, though the share of cooperations
is over 19% in terms of total number of rms in the United States. Brander and Lewis
(1986) theoretically considered the relationships between an oligopolistic product market
and nancial structure, and they showed that limited liability may induce a leveraged
rm to a more aggressive output stance 3. As is the case for strategic delegation, there
1These analytical frameworks seem to be supported by the result of McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing (1962).
They present the average correlation coecients for executive compensation and sales and for executive
compensation and prots from the data on revenues, prots, and compensation for 45 enterprises from
1953 to 1959; they then show that the former is larger than the latter and that the signicance of the t
values for the former is consistently higher than for the latter.
2See Sengul, Gimeno and Dial (2012) for a recent good survey on strategic delegation in economics
and management literature.
3Etro (2010) characterized the optimal nancial structure as a strategic device to optimize the value
2
are also many works concerning nancial structure. 4
As previously mentioned, a modern large company can be considered an oligopolistic,
management-controlled rm with limited liability. From this perspective, previous works
concerning each topic have the following drawback. An oligopolist is assumed to be a
limited liability company in nancial structure literature, while one is assumed to be a
prot-maximizer in the strategic delegation literature. The previous literature is also
limited by focusing only on a symmetric equilibrium.
In a Cournot duopoly with demand uncertainty, we examine the eect of limited lia-
bility on whether an owner delegates its tasks, decisions, and responsibility to a manager.
In this sense, our research can be regarded as an amalgam of the works of Fershtman
and Judd (1987) and Brander and Lewis (1986). To derive a clear result and to ensure
an asymmetric equilibrium, we modify the models of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and
Brander and Lewis (1986) as follows. Although Fershtman and Judd (1987) assumed
that a rm's managerial incentive chosen by its owner represents a linear combination
of its sales and its prots, we assume that this incentive is either its sales or its prots.
We consider the situation in which a rm's managerial incentive is its sales (resp. its
prots) as the situation in which its owner delegates (resp. does not delegate) its tasks
to its manager. While this assumption is certainly restrictive, it allows us to generate an
asymmetric equilibrium, that is, one rm chooses delegation, while another rm selects
no delegation at the equilibrium and it is supported by empirical evidence in McGuire,
Chiu, and Elbing (1962) and Amihud and Kamin (1979). While Brander and Lewis
(1986) assumed that a rm nances a xed start-up or project cost, we assume that it
nances to pay for variable production costs, following Povel and Raith (2004). Cleary
et al. (2007) empirically supported this assumption by Povel and Raith (2004), which
makes our model tractable.
We consider a two-stage duopoly game with demand uncertainty under both unlimited
liability and limited liability. In the rst stage, shareholders of each rm simultaneously
choose the mode of delegation by designing an incentive scheme for the manager of their
rm, either no strategic delegation (prot maximization) or strategic delegation (sales
maximization)5. In the second stage, the manager of each rm simultaneously chooses
of a rm competing in a market for which entry is endogenous, and he showed the general optimality of
moderate debt nancing under both quantity and price competition in an oligopoly with cost uncertainty.
4For example, see Ne (2003) for the related literature.
5In this paper, we do not consider the choice of organizational form by owners of oligopolistic rms,
that is the choice between "limited liability" and "unlimited liability." But Ohkawa, Shinkai, Okamura,
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her output quantity after she observes the objective of her rival rm. That is, in the second
stage game, following the Brander-Lewis framework, we rst consider a la Cournot three
types of duopoly with demand uncertainty, each of which is composed of rms with no
strategic delegation or with a strategic delegation under unlimited liability and mixed
delegation-type duopoly, in which a no delegation rm and a delegation rm coexist.
We derive a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. By comparing the equilibria of
subgames, we characterize the equilibrium outputs, prices, and total outputs in these
equilibria. Then, we proceed to the similar analysis under limited liability. We explore
how dierent modes of delegation under unlimited liability or limited liability aect the
strategic behavior of rms and the outcomes in these equilibria.
Consequently, we show that delegation equilibrium always occurs as a whole game
equilibrium under limited liability, although delegation equilibrium occurs when poten-
tial demand is not too small; however, mixed delegation-type equilibria exist if potential
demand is small under unlimited liability.
The result we derive in this paper illustrates how heterogeneous rms compete in an
oligopoly under risk, for example the U.S. S&L crisis context in the seminal book by
Milgrom and Roberts (1992)6. That is, by the derived result, we present an explanation
of how the eect of competition caused by the intrinsic characteristics of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation(FSLIC)'s insurance for bank deposit (which
plays a similar role to a limited liability system in our model) works, though we do not
explicitly address the moral hazard problem.
Furthermore, we dene the expected social welfare at the equilibria and compare the
expected social welfare at the three subgame equilibria previously derived. Using the
sum of potential demand and demand risk, we characterize which of the three subgame
equilibria would be desirable from a social welfare perspective. We nd that a Delegation
duopoly equilibrium in a whole game under limited liability is most desirable from a social
welfare perspective for any value of the demand parameter.
In the next section, we describe the structure of our model. In section 3, under
unlimited liability, we derive a two-stage duopoly game in which each rm chooses the
and Harimaya (2011) endogenize the choice of organizational form of the oligopolistic rms in the rst
stage, and these rms then compete in a Cournot fashion in the second stage.
6In subsection 'The Perverse Eect of Competition' in Chapter 6, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) de-
scribed, "Normally we think of competition, which tends to drive out those executives who are unwilling
to take the prot-maximizing actions, as promoting eciency. In the context of S&L industry in 1980s,
however, competition had a perverse eect. Many conservative S&L executives had no choice but to
gamble on risky investments if they were to survive in the circumstances we have described."
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mode of delegation, that is, either no strategic delegation or strategic delegation at the
rst stage, then competes in a la Cournot fashion at the second stage under unlimited
liability. In subsection 4.1, we consider a Cournot duopoly subgame that is composed of
two rms with no strategic delegation under limited liability and derive an equilibrium of
this subgame. In subsection 4.2, we derive a Cournot equilibrium in the duopoly subgame
that is composed of two rms with strategic delegation; in subsection 4.3, we derive a
Cournot equilibrium in the mixed type duopoly subgame that is composed of one rm
with no strategic delegation and another rm with strategic delegation under limited
liability. In subsection 4.4, we consider the rst stage, in which each rm chooses the
mode of delegation (its objective), either strategic delegation or no strategic delegation,
and derive a subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game by combining it with the
three two-stage Cournot duopoly subgames considered in the preceding subsections. In
section 5, we evaluate the equilibrium of the whole game from a social welfare perspective.
The nal section contains our discussion and concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a duopoly in which two rms produce a homogeneous good with an identical
constant marginal cost. There also exists additive demand uncertainty. We assume that
the shareholders of each rm are protected by limited liability eects in this duopoly
market. Their objective is to maximize the expected prot of the shareholders of the
rm they own. They delegate their decision of the rm's output to a manager; how-
ever, they control the manager by designing incentives scheme to attain their objective,
that is, net prot maximization (after deducting rewards for their manager). Fershtman
and Judd (1987) assumed that the manager of rm i is given an incentive to maximize
ii + (1   i)Ri, where i and Ri are the prot and revenue of rm i, respectively,
and i is the weight assigned to the prot of the manager's incentive. They showed
that the shareholders of each rm always give an incentive weighted more to sales than
to prot (i.e., small i < 1) to their manager at the equilibrium if the marginal cost
of production of their rm is suciently low. Vickers (1985) also presented an example
in which shareholders strategically adjust their manager's incentive not to behave as a
prot-maximizer7.
7Vickers (1985) assumed that the manager of oligopolistic rm i(= 1; 2;    ; n) has the objective to
maximizeMi = i+iqi, where i; qi, and i are prot, quantity of output, and some strategic parameter
5
In this paper, we thus restrict our attention to two polar cases, i = 0 (sales maxi-
mization) and i = 1 (prot maximization) because the prot and sales of each rm is
observable (known) to one another8. The shareholders can ask for debt Di (i = 1; 2) from
outside investors if the equity capital is not sucient to nance production. According to
Brander and Lewis (1986), the debt holders are residual claimants in case of bankruptcy.
Hence, the shareholders of the rm do not care about the returns in the bad state; they
are only concerned with the returns in the good state. When the rm takes debt, it is
more inclined to follow strategies that provide more returns in the good state and fewer
returns in the bad state. That is, we say that the rm is protected by the limited liability
eect of debt nancing. The limited liability eect induces the rm to assume more risk.
As Brander and Lewis (1986) established, a leveraged rm behaves more aggressively
than does the unleveraged rm. In this paper, we consider the strategic delegation eect
in addition to this limited liability eect.
Suppose that each rm can choose its mode of strategic delegation from strategic
delegation (sales maximization) and no strategic delegation (prot maximization) in the
rst stage. Then given the mode of delegations, two rms compete in a la Cournot in
the second stage.
The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear with an additive uncertainty,
p = a+ ez  Q = a+ ez   (q1 + q2); (1)
where a denotes the magnitude of the market and ez is a uniformly distributed random
variable with support [ z; z], a  z > 0 and with the probability density function
(z) =
1
2z
; for z 2 [ z; z] (2)
= 0; otherwise.
>From (2), we observe that ez has mean 0 and variance 1
3
z2. We also assume that rm
variable on the incentive for manager of rm i.
8If we set i = c or i = 0 in the objective of rm i's manager function with constant returns to scale
technology
Mi = i + iqi = (p(Q)  (c  i)) qi
then Vickers(1985)'s example reduces to the cases i = 0 (sales maximization) and i = 1 (prot
maximization), respectively.
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i (= 1; 2) has a linear cost function
Ci(qi) = cqi; a > c > 0.
We normalize c = 1. Here we make a key assumption in our analysis of leveraged
rms under limited liability. That is, we assume that rms are nancially constrained
and must nance all or part of their variable costs by borrowing from their investors
or banks, following Povel and Raith (2004). Most of the debt contract literature as-
sumes that a rm or an entrepreneur must nance a xed start-up or project cost, as
Brander and Lewis (1986) assumed in their paper. In these papers, the equilibrium out-
put and the equilibrium debt level of each rm are not derived explicitly on account of
the nonlinearity of the reaction function of each rm as described in the analysis of the
Brander-Lewis framework9. Povel and Raith (2004), however, have considered a Cournot
duopoly in which one of the rms is nancially constrained and must nance all or part
of its variable cost by borrowing from an investor and in which another rm is not nan-
cially constrained10. Under their assumption, the choice of output of each rm uniquely
determines its level of debt, thus making our analysis more tractable. We thus assume
that debt level of each rm is a linear cost function of the rm's output under limited
liability. We take the debt assumed by the rm as endogenous. The rm takes on debt
only to nance its production. That is,
Di = cqi = qi.
The prot of rm i(= 1; 2) is dened as
i(qi; qj; ez) = Ri(qi; qj; ez)  Ci(qi) = (a+ ez   qi   qj   1)qi. (3)
9In the Brander-Lweis framework, Ri (the gross prot function) is assumed to depend on the outputs
qi ; qj and the random shock ezi with support [ z; z]. A threshold value of realization z of ezi, bzi is also
assumed such that the rm is bankrupt for zi < bzi and that equity holders are residual claimants only in
good state of nature (zi  bzi). Then, the value of bzi depends not only on the debt level of Bi, but also
on qi and qj . Therefore, the reaction function of a rm with respect to qi becomes a nonlinear function
of qi. For example, see Franck and Pape (2008).
10As Povel and Raith (2004) stated in their paper, "internal funds" denotes the rm's own funds that
it can use to pay for variable production costs, w0  r0   F , where r0 and F denote the rms retained
earnings and xed cost, respectively. Cleary et al. (2007) show that w0 < 0, that is, "negative internal
funds" are empirically relevant using 20 years of annual Compustat data, so we can expect that a rm
must nance variable costs in such cases. Hence, we think that the role of a risky debt contract on
product rivalry in a duopoly under the assumption in Povel and Raith (2004) must merit investigation.
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Because the revenue of rm i (Ri(qi; qj; z) = (a+ z   qi  qj   c)qi) is increasing in z,
we can dene the repayment function under limited liability as r  minfRi(qi; qj; z); Dig
for any given realized value z of ez:
r = Ri(qi; qj; z); if   z  z < bz
= Di = qi, if z  z  bz,
where bz is dened as
Di = qi = (a+ bz   qi   qj)qi = Ri(qi; qj; bz).
bz =  (a  qi   qj   1). (4)
Following the assumption of Brander and Lewis (1986) for bz, we assume that 11
 z < bz < z. (5)
The expected prot function of rm i under limited liability is given by
Eez [i(qi; qj; ez)] = Z z
 z
(Ri(qi; qj; z)  Ci(qi) +Di   r)(z)dz
=
Z z
bz (a+ z   qi   qj   1)qi
1
2z
dz +
Z bz
 z
0(z)dz
=
1
4z
qi(z   bz)2. (6)
We assume the following to guarantee a positive output in equilibrium.
[Assumption1]
z > 1
3
(a  1).
11This assumption guarantees that bz, the break-even realized value of ez, at which the expected net
prot (sales) of the rms after full repayment Di exists between the closed interval [ z; z].
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3 A Two-stage Game under Unlimited Liability
We rst derive a two-stage duopoly game in which each rm chooses the mode of del-
egation, either No delegation (prot maximization) or Delegation (sales maximization),
at the rst stage; they then compete a la Cournot at the second stage under unlimited
liability.
We consider second-stage games. Given that each rm chooses No delegation as its
mode of delegation, we have an equilibrium in the Cournot duopoly game.
From (3), the rst order condition is given by
a  2qUNi   qUNj   1 = 0; i; j = 1; 2; (7)
where the superscript \UN" of qi denotes that the mode of delegation for each rm
is No delegation under Unlimited liability.
From (7) and (1), we can easily obtain each rm's output, total output, and expected
price at the equilibrium:
qUNi =
1
3
(a  1); i = 1; 2;
QUN =
2
3
(a  1);
EpUN =
1
3
(a+ 2): (8)
By (1) and (3), we have
EUNi = E[(p
UN   1)qUNi ] = (qUNi )2 =
1
9
(a  1)2; i = 1; 2;
EPSUN = 2EUNi =
2
9
(a  1)2;
ECSUN =
1
2
E[(a+ ez   pUN)QUN ] = 1
2
(QUN)2 =
2
9
(a  1)2;
ESSUN = EPSUN + ECSUN =
4
9
(a  1)2, (9)
where PS, CS, and SS denote producers' surplus, consumers' surplus, and social
surplus, respectively.
Next, given that each rm chooses Delegation as its mode of delegation, a simple
9
calculation provides us with the Cournot equilibrium. Each rm i maximizes its expected
sales (revenue),
ERUDi = max
qi
E[(a+ ez   qUDi   qUDj )qUDi ],
where the superscript \UD"of qi denotes that the mode of delegation for each rm is
Delegation under unlimited liability.
The rst order condition is
a  2qUDi   qUDj = 0; i; j = 1; 2. (10)
From (10) and (1), we can easily obtain each rm's output, the total output, and the
expected price at the equilibrium:
qUDi =
1
3
a; i = 1; 2;
QUD =
2
3
a;
EpUD =
1
3
a: (11)
By (1) and (3), we have12
EUDi = E[(p  1)qUDi ] =
1
3
(a  3)  1
3
a =
1
9
a(a  3); i = 1; 2;
EPSUD = 2EUDi =
2
9
a2;
ECSUD =
1
2
E[(a+ ez   p)QUD] = 1
2
(QUD)2 =
2
9
a2;
ESSUD = EPSUD + ECSUD =
2
9
a(2a  3). (12)
We examine the mixed delegation type Cournot duopoly, in which one rm (say, rm 1)
adopts No delegation (prot maximization) while another (say, rm 2) adopts Delegation
(sales maximization) under Unlimited liability. We denote by superscript \UN" of the
associated variables the mixed-delegation type Cournot duopoly.
12To guarantee positive expected prot , we assume that a > 3.
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Setting i = 1; j = 2 in (7) and i = 2; j = 1 in (10) yields
a  2qUND1   qUND2   1 = 0;
a  2qUND2   qUND1 = 0,
where the superscript \UND"of q1(q2) shows that the mode of delegation of rm 1
(rm 2) is No delegation (Delegation) under Unlimited liability.
Thus, we obtain
qUND1 =
1
3
(a  2); qUND2 =
1
3
(a+ 1). (13)
From (1), we have
EQUND =
1
3
(2a  1);
EpUND =
1
3
(a+ 1): (14)
By (1) and (3), we have
EUND1 = E[(p
UND   1)qUND1 ] =
1
9
(a  2)2;
EUND2 = E[(p
UND   1)qUND2 ] =
1
9
(a  2)(a+ 1);
EPSUND = EUND1 + E
UND
2 =
1
9
(a  2)(2a  1);
ECSUND =
1
2
E[(a+ ez   pUND)QUND] = 1
2
(QUND)2 =
1
18
(2a  1)2;
ESSUND = EPSUND + ECSUND =
1
18
(2a  1)(4a  5). (15)
From above equalities, we derive the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that a > 3. Then, we have
qUND2 > q
UD
i > q
UN
i > q
UND
1 , Q
UD > QUND > QUN , and EpUD < EpUND < EpUN . If
11
a  4, then EUND2 > EUNi  EUDi  EUND1 . If 3 < a < 4, then EUND2 > EUNi >
EUND1 > E
UD
i .
The intuition for the lemma is clear. The Delegation (sales maximizer) rm in the UD
equilibrium produces more aggressively than does the No delegation (prot-maximizer)
rm in the UN equilibrium because the former acts without considering its cost. This
result intrinsically corresponds to the result presented in Fershtman and Judd (1987). In
the UND mixed-delegation type duopoly equilibrium, in addition to no consideration on
cost, the strategic substitute property in Cournot competition makes the Delegation (sales
maximization) rm 2 act more aggressively, so the No delegation (prot maximization)
rm 1 reacts by shrinking its output as compared to the UN equilibrium.
To illustrate the result on the expected rm prots in the lemma, from (9) and (15),
we have
EUN1   EUND1 = E[pUN   1]qUN1   E[pUND   1]qUND1 (16)
= E[pUN   1](qUN1   qUND1 ) + E[pUN   pUND]qUND1 .
We consider the rst stage game summarized in Table 1.
Firm 1/Firm 2 N D
N EUN1 ; E
UN
2 E
UND
1 ; E
UND
2
D EUDN1 ; E
UDN
2 E
UD
1 ; E
UD
2
Let \N" and \D" denote the the modes of delegation \No delegation" and \Delegation,"
respectively.
Table 1 First stage game (under unlimited liability)
Note that EUDN2 = E
UND
1 and E
UDN
1 = E
UND
2 . From Lemma 1 and Table 1, we
derive;
Proposition 1 Suppose that a  4. Then, the equilibrium mode of delegation is
(D;D). Suppose that 3 < a < 4. Then, the equilibrium mode is mixed, either (D;N) or
(N;D).
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We also present the following result.
Proposition 2 ESSUD > ESSUN > ESSUN .
The Delegation duopoly is most desirable and it is attained as an equilibrium in the
two-stage game for large demand (a  4) under unlimited liability.
Note that there exists the mixed-delegation type equilibrium ((D;N) or (N;D)) when
the potential demand is small because both no consideration on cost and the strategic
substitute property in a Cournot competition makes the Delegation (sales maximization)
rm 2 act more aggressively, so the No delegation (prot maximization) rm 1 reacts
by greatly shrinking its output because of the small residual demand after deducting
the expanding output of the Delegation rm 2 if the No delegation rm 1 still may stay
(may not exit from the market) in duopoly market. However, owners of rm 1 choose
Delegation instead of No delegation if the potential demand is large enough and she
expects that residual demand after deduction of the expanding output of the Delegation
rm 2 is suciently abandoned, and the equilibrium that may be attained is Delegation
one, (D;D).
4 A Two-stage Game under Limited Liability
In this section, we derive a two-stage duopoly game in which each rm chooses its mode
of delegation from No delegation and Delegation in the rst stage; they then compete in
a la Cournot fashion in the second stage under limited liability.
4.1 Cournot Subgame Composed of No delegation under Lim-
ited Liability
In this subsection, we consider Cournot duopoly comprising two rms with No delegation
under limited liability. We denote the duopoly in which the mode of delegation of each
rm is No delegation (prot-maximization) under Limited liability by superscript "LN."
We name the Cournot equilibrium in this duopoly "the LN equilibrium," hereafter. Be-
cause the rm under limited liability repays r  minfRi(qi; qj; z); Dig for some realized
value z of ez, rm i (i = 1; 2) maximizes its expected prot after deducting of repayment
to its investors.
13
The rst order condition is given by
@LNi
@qi
=
Z z
bzLN
@
@qi
[Ri(qi; qj; z)  qi](z)dz + (a+ bzLN   qi   qj   1)qi  @bzLN
@qi
(bzLN)
=
Z z
bzLN (a+ z   2qi   qj   1)
1
2z
dz( * (4))
=
1
2z
(z   bzLN)
2

 qi + z   bzLN
2

= 0.
Because z   bz > 0 holds from (5), we see that  qi + z bz2 = 0 holds.
Substituting (4) into this equality, we obtain
1
2
 
a  3qLNi   qLNj   1 + z

= 0; i = 1; 2. (17)
From the symmetry of qLNi and q
LN
j , setting q
LN
i = q
LN
j = q
LN in (17), we obtain
qLN =
1
4
(t  1) > 0, (18)
where t  a+ z:13
By (18) and (1), we see that
E

pLN
  E a+ ez   2qLN = 1
2
(2a+ 1  t) .
bzLN =  1
2
(a  z   1) . (19)
We can show that z < bzLN < z.14
Hence, we obtain the equilibrium net expected prot of rm i from (6), (19), and (20)
13The inequality holds from the assumption 1. From t = a + z > 1 + 13 (a   1) > 1 holds because
a > 1 > 0.
14
z   bzLND = 1
2
(t  1) = 1
2
(a+ z   1) > 1
2

a+
1
3
(a  1)

>
1
6
(a  1) > 0 (20)
and
(bzLND)  ( z) = z + bzLND = 1
2
(3z   a+ 1) > 0;
where the inequality holds from assumption 1.
14
LNi  LN =
Z z
bzLN (a+ z   2q
LN   1)qLN  1
2z
dz
=
1
2z
qLN  1
2
 
z   bzLN2 (* (17))
=
1
z
 
qLN
3
=
1
64z
(t  1)3 ; i = 1; 2. (21)
4.2 Cournot Subgame Composed of Delegation Firms under
Limited Liability
In this subsection, we derive a Cournot duopoly composed of two rms with Delegation
under Limited liability. We denote the duopoly in which the choice of the mode of dele-
gation of each rm is Delegation (sales maximization) by superscript\LD" Furthermore,
we call the Cournot equilibrium in this duopoly \the LD equilibrium." Although a rm
with Delegation mode has to repay all of her sales to investors when its sales less are than
Dj, it does not care about any repayment when its sales are more than Dj under limited
liability. That is, rm j maximizes its net sales Rj(qj; qi; z), dened by
Rj(qj; qi; z) = Rj(qj; qi; z)  r = 0; if -z  z < bzLD
= Rj(qj; qi; z), otherwise.
Hence, the expected sales maximization problem for rm j (j = 1; 2) under limited
liability is given by
RLDj  max
qj
Z z
 zLD
Rj(qj; qi; z)(z)dz
= max
qj
Z z
bzLDRj(qj; qi; z)(z)dz
= max
qj
1
2z
(z   bzLD)21
2
qj
= max
qj
1
4z
qj

(a+ z   qj   qj)2   1
	
: (22)
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The rst order condition is
@RLDj
@qj
=
1
4z
 
a+ z   qLDj   qLDi
  
a+ z   3qLDj   qLDi
  1 = 0,
or
 
a+ z   qLDj   qLDi
  
a+ z   3qLDj   qLDi
  1 = 0: (23)
From the symmetry of qLDi and q
LD
j , and by setting q
LD = qLDi = q
LD
j in (23), we
then obtain the quadratic equation of qLD,
t2   1  6tqLD + 8(qLD )2 = 0.
This quadratic equation has two distinct real solutions,
qLD =
1
8

3t+
p
t2 + 8

;
1
8

3t 
p
t2 + 8

.
Because the former solution violates the condition (5), that is, z   bzLD = a + z  
2qLD   1 = t QLD   1 > 0.
Consequently, the equilibrium output of each rm and bzLD are
qLD =
1
8

3t 
p
t2 + 8

, (24)
bzLD =  1
4

4(a  1)  3t+
p
t2 + 8

. (25)
Lemma 2 If t  a+z > 1and t > 1
12
(7(2a 1)+p4a2   4a+ 25), then bzLD satises
assumption (5).
Proof: See the appendix.
Hence, we obtain the ex ante equilibrium expected net prot of rm j from (6),(24),
and (25),
16
LDj = 
LD =
Z z
bzLD(a+ z   2q
LD   1)qLD  1
2z
dz
=
1
512z

3t 
p
t2 + 8

t  4 +
p
t2 + 8
2
. (26)
Comparing each rm's output, total output, expected price, and expected net prot
derived in the preceding section with those derived in this section, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Each rm produces more and earns higher prots in the LD equilib-
rium than in the LN equilibrium. Consequently, the total output in the former equilibrium
is greater and the expected price in the former is lower than in the latter one. Formally,
qLD > qLN ; QLD > QLN ; E[pLD] < E[pLN ] and LDj > 
LN
i .
Proof: See the appendix.
We provide the following intuitive explanation of the results. From (21) and (22), each
rm maximizes its expected prot after deducting the repayment to its investor for any
realized value of z in the LN equilibrium. In the LD equilibrium, each rm maximizes its
sales after repayment all of its sales to investors when the state of nature is bad ( z  z bz), so her sales are less than the debt. She maximizes its sales without considering any
repayment to its investors when the state of nature is good (bz < z  z) so its sales are
more than the debt. Therefore, each rm in the LD equilibrium produces its output more
aggressively than it does in the LN equilibrium. Consequently, the latter earns more than
the former.
4.3 Cournot Subgame Composed of Mixed-Delegation under
Limited Liability
In this subsection, we consider a new type of duopoly that has yet to be considered
in the related literature, including Brander and Lewis (1986) and Fershtman and Judd
(1987). That is, we consider the mixed-delegation Cournot duopoly, in which the mode
of delegation of rm 1 is No delegation (prot maximization), while that of another is
Delegation (sales maximization) under limited liability. We denote this mixed-delegation
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type duopoly by superscript "LND(LDN)." Furthermore, we call the Cournot equilibrium
in this duopoly "the Mixed Delegation equilibrium."
We assume that the mode of delegation of rm 1 (2) is No delegation (Delegation).
From (4) and (17), the rst order condition for rm 1 is given by
1
2
(t  1  3qLND1   qLND2 ) = 0.
From (4) and (23), the rst order condition for rm 2 with Delegation in the mixed
delegation type duopoly is given by
 
t  qLND2   qLND1
  
t  3qLN2   qLND1
  1 = 0 (27)
From the above equalities, we have
qLND1 =
1
16
(2t  7 +
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17), (28)
where t > 1. For a detailed derivation of qLND1 , see the appendix. Thus, we also have
qLND2 =
1
16
(5(2t+ 1)  3
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17). (29)
That is, when the sum of latent demand a and the degree of the demand risk z is su-
ciently larger than the marginal cost c = 1, the sales maximizing rm 2 expands its output
aggressively under limited liability, so that prot maximizing rm 1 shrinks its output on
account of stronger strategic substitute eect in the Mixed Delegation equilibrium than
that in the LN and LD equilibria.
By (28), (29) and (1), we see that
E

pLND
  E a+ ez   qLND2   qLND1  = a  18(6t  1 p4t2 + 4t+ 17) > 0, (30)
for t > 1. For bzLND to satisfy (5), we derive the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If a satises the condition that
1
16
(7(2t+ 1) 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17) > a >
1
8
(6t+ 7 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17), (31)
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then bzLND satises assumption (5)15.
Proof: See the appendix.
Hence, for the Mixed Delegation equilibrium to exist, both (5) and (31) must hold.
That is, these conditions imply that there must exist sucient latent demand or some
extent of demand risk (high value of z and a) for Delegation rm 2 to expand its output
aggressively, while No delegation rm 1 can survive in the Mixed Delegation duopoly.
We derive the expected prot of the No delegation (prot maximization) rm 1, LND1 ,
and the expected prot of the Delegation (sales maximization) rm 2, LND2 .
LND1 =
Z z
bzLND(a+ z   q
LND
1   qLND2   1)qLND1 
1
2z
dz
=
1
z
 
qLND1
3
=
1
163z

2t  7 +
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17
3
, (32)
LND2 =
Z z
bzLND(a+ z   q
LND
1   qLND2   1)qLND2 
1
2z
dz
=
1
2z
qLND2 
1
2
 
z   bzLND2
=
1
z
 
qLND2

(qLND1 )
2 =
1
163z
(5(2t+ 1)  3
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17)

2t  7 +
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17
2
.
(33)
From (32) and (33), we have
LND1   LLND2 =
1
z
 
qLND1
2
(qLND1   qLND2 ) < 0.
From (28) and (29), we can easily show that qLND1   qLND2 < 0 , t > 1. However,
both ((A.5)) and ( 31) must hold for the existence of the Mixed Delegation equilibrium.
We next present the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the sum of latent demand and the degree of the demand risk is
suciently large compared to its marginal cost, then Delegation rm 2 produces more
15We can easily show that 116 (7(2t+ 1) 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17) > 18 (6t+ 7 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17);for t > 1.
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output and earns more than No delegation rm 1 does in the Mixed Delegation LND
equilibrium. Formally, if t > 1, then qLND1 < q
LND
2 and 
LND
1 < 
LND
2 hold.
Comparing each rm's equilibrium output in the LN, LD, and the Mixed Delegation
(LND, LDN ) equilibria from the arguments in the preceding two sections, we can present
the following lemma and proposition. We restrict our attention to the case in which
there exists the Mixed Delegation (LND,LDN ) equilibrium, that is, we assume that the
condition on a and t; (31) hold.
Lemma 4 If t; the sum of latent demand and the degree of the demand risk, is larger
than its marginal cost 1, then Delegation rm 2 in the LND equilibrium produces more
output than each No delegation rm 1 does in the LN equilibrium and each Delegation
rm in the LD equilibrium. If t is larger than 1, then No delegation 1 in the LND
equilibrium produces less than each Delegation rm does in the LD equilibrium and each
No delegation rm in the LN equilibrium. Formally, if t > 1, then qLND2 > q
LN ; qLND2 >
qLD; qLND1 < q
LD, and qLND1 < q
LN .
Proof: See the appendix.
From Proposition 4 and Lemma 4, we can easily show the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If t > 1, then qLND1 (= q
LDN
2 ) < q
LN < qLD < qLND2 (= q
LDN
1 ).
From (18), (24), (29), (28) and the fact that
QLN = 2qLN ; QLM  qLND1 + qLND2 = qLDN1 + qLDN2 ; QLD = 2qLD (34)
and
Epk = E

a+ ez  Qk , k = LN;LD;LM . (35)
Using the fact above, we can show the corollary.
Corollary 1 If t is larger than 1, then the total output in LD equilibrium is the
most, the one in the LN equilibrium the least, and the one in the Mixed Delegation
(LND or LDN) equilibrium lies between them. In consequent, the expected price in LD
equilibrium is the highest, the one in the LN equilibrium the lowest, and the one in the
Mixed Delegation(LND or LDN) equilibrium lies between them. Formally, if t > 1, then
QLN < QLM < QLD and EpLN > EpLM > EpLD;where LM = LND or LDN .
Proof: See the appendix.
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4.4 First Stage Equilibrium in the Whole Game under Limited
Liability
We examine the rst stage under limited liability, and derive a subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the whole game. The rst stage is summarized as Table 2.
Firm 1/Firm 2 N D
N LN1 ; 
LN
2 
LND
1 ; 
LND
2
D LDN1 ; 
LDN
2 
LD
1 ; 
LD
2
Table 2 First stage game (under Limited liability)
Let \N" and \D" denote the modes of delegation\No delegation" and \Delegation," respec-
tively.
We compare the expected prots derived in previous sections. Note that t = a+z > 1
must hold to guarantee the existence of the Mixed Delegation equilibrium. We see that
LDN1 ( = 
LND
2 ) and 
LDN
2 (= 
LND
1 )are positive from (33) and (32) if t > 1. From (6),
we have
LDN1   LN1 =
1
4z
[qLDN1 (a+ z   1 QLM)2   qLN1 (a+ z   1 QLN)2]
>
1
4z
(qLDN1   qLN1 )(a+ z   1 QLN)2 > 0. (36)
Note that LND2   LN2 = LDN1   LN1 . From (32) and (26), we nd
LND1   LD1 =
1
4z
fqLND1 (a+ z   1 QLM)2   qLD1 (a+ z   1 QLD)2g
<
1
4z
(qLND1   qLD1 )(a+ z   1 QLM)2 < 0 (37)
Note that LND1  LD1 = LDN2  LD2 . Then, we can straightforwardly show that the
next lemma from (36) and (37).
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Lemma 5 If t > 1, then the Delegation rm in the LDN or LND (Mixed Delegation)
equilibrium earns more than the No delegation rm in the LN equilibrium, and the No
delegation rm in the LDN or LND (Mixed Delegation) equilibrium earns less than the
Delegation rm in the LD equilibrium. Formally, if t > 1, then LDN1 (= 
LND
2 ) > 
LN
1 (=
LN2 ) and 
LND
1 (= 
LDN
2 ) < 
LD
1 (= 
LD
2 ).
By Table 2 and Lemma 5, we can immediately derive the equilibrium of the two-stage
game.
Proposition 6 If t > 1, the equilibrium mode of delegation of the whole game is the
LD equilibrium, that is, (D;D).
As we have already shown in section 3, the Mixed Delegation equilibrium may be
attained at least when the potential demand is small under unlimited liability. However,
the shareholders may be too eager to undertake risky investment by debt nance under
limited liability 16. Therefore rm owners choose Delegation instead of No delegation
when facing the Delegation rival rm for any potential demand and demand risk over unit
cost under limited liability. As suggested in Corollary 1, the equilibrium total output is
largest and the equilibrium expected price is lowest in the LD equilibrium. Hence, the
equilibrium is expected to be socially ecient, and in the next section we show that this
expectation holds.
4.5 Application case: The Perverse Eect of Competition Mech-
anism in the U.S. S&L Crisis
The result we previously derived illustrates how the competition among heterogeneous
rms works in an oligopoly in the U.S. S&L crisis context in Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
In our LDN equilibrium given in Lemma 5, Delegation rm 1 and No delegation rm 2
in our duopoly correspond to the S&L that directly saw the chance to exploit the FSLIC
deposit insurance system by moving into more risky investments and the S&L who held
out and made only safe investments in the S&L industry, respectively. As we have shown
16Milgrom and Roberts (1992) state in subsection 'Coniction Interests: Current Lenders versus Other
Capital Suppliers' of Chapter 15 that "This is because the owners of shares enjoy virtually all the benets
if returns on the risky investments turn out to be high, but the lenders suer a major portion of losses
if the returns turnout to be low."
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in Lemma 5, however, the prot maximizing shareholders of No delegation rm 2 are
better o if they change the mode of delegation from No delegation to Delegation. This
result implies that in a S&L crisis context, the S&L sound-manager is better o if she
changes her management to gamble on risky investments. In this sense, we present an
explanation of how the perverse eect of competition works caused by intrinsic charac-
teristics of the FSLIC deposit insurance system which plays a similar role to a limited
liability system in our model by a simple but formal model analysis, although we do not
explicitly address the moral hazard problem.
In our model, investors (banks) to each rm, the manager of rm, and the limited
liability system corresponds to depositors of each S&L association, the S&L manager,
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)'s insurance for bank
deposit, respectively, if we apply our setting to the U.S. S&L crisis 17. In the result given
in the paper, Delegation (sales maximizing) rm 1 and No delegation (prot maximizing)
rm 2 in our duopoly correspond to the S&L that directly saw the chance to exploit the
FSLIC deposit insurance system by moving into more risky investments and the S&L
who held out and made only safe investments in the S&L industry, respectively.
5 Welfare Comparison
In this section, we compare the expected social welfare at the three equilibria derived in
the preceding section, and we evaluate the equilibrium of the whole game from a social
welfare perspective.
The expected social surplus is the sum of the net expected producer surplus, the
expected surplus of the bank (investor), and the expected consumer surplus.
The net expected producer surplus at the k (= LN;LD, and LM (LND or LDN))
17See footnote 5 in section 1 for introduction, in detail.
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equilibrium is expressed as
EPSk =
Z z
 z
PSk(Qk; z)(z)dz
=
Z z
 z
(1(qi; qj; z) + 2(qi; qj; z)  r)(z)dz
=
1
2z
Z bzk
 z
f(a+ z  Qk)Qk   (a+ z  Qk)Qkgdz + 1
2z
Z z
bzk (a+ z  Q
k   1)Qkdz
=
1
2z
Z z
bzk (a+ z  Q
k   1)Qkdz. (38)
The expected prot (losses) of bank at the k (= LN;LD, and LM) equilibrium is
given by
EBP k =
1
2z
Z bzk
 z
f(a+ z  Qk)Qk  Digdz + 1
2z
Z z
bzk (Di  Q
k)dz
=
1
2z
Z bzk
 z
(a+ z  Qk   1)Qkdz + 1
2z
Z z
bzk (Q
k  Qk)dz
=
1
2z
Z bzk
 z
(a+ z  Qk   1)Qkdz (39)
The expected consumers' surplus at the k (= LN;LD, and LM (LND or LDN))
equilibrium is
ECSk =
Z z
 z
CSk(Qk; z)(z)dz
=
Z z
 z
1
2
fa+ z   (a+ z  Qk)gQk(z)dz
=
1
2z
Z z
 z
1
2
(Qk)2dz =
1
2
(Qk)2. (40)
We dene the expected social surplus at the k (= LN;LD, and LM (LND or LDN))
equilibrium as
ESSk = EPSk + EBP k + ECSk. (41)
Substituting (38), (39), and (40) into (41) and rearranging yield
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ESSk =
1
2z
Z z
bzk (a+ z  Q
k   1)Qkdz + 1
2z
Z bzk
 z
(a+ z  Qk   1)Qkdz + 1
2
(Qk)2
=
1
2z
Z z
 z
(a+ z  Qk   1)Qkdz + 1
2
(Qk)2
=
1
2z
Qk

(a Qk   1)z + z
2
2
z
 z
+
1
2
(Qk)2
= (a Qk   1)Qk + 1
2
(Qk)2
= (a  1
2
Qk   1)Qk  F (Qk): (42)
That is, the expected social surplus at the k equilibrium is expressed by a concave
quadratic function of the total output of each equilibrium.
The function F has a maximum at Q = a  1. Then, we have
F 0(Qk) R 0; if Qk Q Q = a  1. (43)
Because E[pk   1] = E[a+ z   1 Qk] = a  1 Qk = Q  Qk > 0, Q > Qk holds.
Note that t = a+z > 1 guarantees the existence of the Mixed Delegation equilibrium.
We can easily show the following proposition from Corollary 1. Hence, the proof of the
proposition is omitted.
Proposition 7 If t is larger than 1, then the expected social surplus in the LD equi-
librium is the largest, that in the LN equilibrium the least, and that in the Mixed Del-
egation equilibrium lies between them under limited liability. Formally if t > 1, then
ESSLN < ESSLM < ESSLD (LM = LND or LDN) holds.
From the results derived in the preceding and this sections, we see that Delegation
duopoly equilibrium is always desirable most a social welfare perspective, and it can
be attained as an equilibrium in the two-stage game under limited liability. That is,
we can interpret this result as managerial incentives with less-weighed to prot prevail
and it always attains ecient Delegation duopoly equilibrium in duopoly under a limited
liability system irrespective of potential demand and demand risk under unlimited liability,
although investors (banks) do not play any positive role as economic agents to achieve
their own objectives, but only lend an amount equal to the requested variable cost.
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From the result derived in section 3, note that the Mixed delegation (one rm chooses
No delegation and another chooses Delegation) duopoly prevails as an equilibrium when
potential demand is small, however the Delegation duopoly prevails when this demand
becomes large.
This result of course holds only for the scenario in which the moral hazard problem
never exists, as is the case for this work. In the real business world, lenders (banks)
take precautions to ensure that their money is not squandered, or put at unnecessary
risk by those who have borrowed it, because there exists the moral hazard problem
of borrowers. That is, they monitor what they lend by examining the rms' nancial
condition and credit history and by placing restrictions on how their funds may be used.
Our analysis ignores this moral hazard problem and so also ignores such monitoring
activities of investors. The results of this welfare analysis may dier if the analysis
considers the moral hazard problem.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this article, we consider a duopoly with additive demand uncertainty in which there
are two rms producing and supplying a homogeneous good with an identical constant
return to scale technology. We consider No delegation rm and Delegation rm the two
polar types of incentive contracts, one of which attaches great importance to prot and
another of which places less emphasis on prot but more on sales. First, we derive a two-
stage duopoly game in which shareholders of each rm choose the mode of delegation
between No delegation (prot maximization) and Delegation (sales maximization) at the
rst stage, then compete in a la Cournot fashion at the second stage under unlimited
liability. By deriving a subgame perfect equilibrium in this two-stage game, we show that
a Mixed delegation-type duopoly occurs as an SPE for small potential demand; however,
a Delegation duopoly occurs as an equilibrium for large potential demand under unlimited
liability. Furthermore, we show that a Delegation duopoly is always the most ecient from
a social welfare perspective and that it is attained as an equilibrium of the two-stage game
for large potential demand under unlimited liability.
Next, by deriving three equilibria of Cournot duopoly subgames under limited liabil-
ity, we explore how dierences in the mode of delegation and limited liability aect the
strategic behavior of rms and the outcomes. Then, we derive a subgame perfect equi-
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librium this two-stage entire game in which each rm's mode of delegation choices are
endogenized under limited liability. Consequently, we show that a Delegation duopoly is
always attained as an equilibrium under limited liability. Though in our model investors
(banks) do not play any positive role as economic agents to achieve their own objectives
but only lend an amount equal to the requested variable cost, we present an explana-
tion of how the competition among heterogeneous rms in an oligopoly works caused by
the intrinsic characteristics of a limited liability system by a simple but formal model
analysis by the derived result. We present the perverse eect of competition mechanism
in the U.S. S&L crisis context in Milgrom and Roberts (1992) as an application to the
real case, in which our result illustrates how the competition among heterogeneous rms
in an oligopoly works caused by intrinsic characteristics of the FSLIC deposit insurance
system which plays a similar role to a limited liability system in our model.
Furthermore, we dene an expected social welfare at the equilibria and compare the
expected social welfare at the three equilibria previously derived. We nd that a Delega-
tion duopoly under limited liability is the most desirable from a social welfare perspective
for any value of the sum of potential demand and demand risk that is larger than unit
cost.
There remains much work to consider. In the paper, we consider the relationship
between strategic delegation and the limited liability system only in a Cournot duopoly
with strategic substitute model structure. The rst issue to address is the extension of
our analysis to an oligopoly setting. Furthermore, as Etro (2012) emphasizes in his paper,
it is important to consider the relationship between strategic delegation and the limited
liability system in a price competition setting with strategic complementarity. This issue
also remains to be addressed by our future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: For bzLD to satisfy the assumption (5), we also have from assumption 1 and
(20)
z   bzLD = a+ z  QLD   1
=
1
4
p
t2 + 8  (t  4

=
1
4
p
t2 + 8  (t  4)

> 0, 8(t  1) > 0, t > 1;
(A.1)
where t  a+ z > 1.
We can also show that
z   ( bzLLD) = z + zLD
=
1
4

 a  z + 8z + 4 
p
(a+ z)2 + 8

=
1
4

7t  8a+ 4 
p
t2 + 8

> 0
, 6t2   7(2a  1) + 8a2   8a+ 1 > 0
equivalently
t <
1
12
(7(2a  1) 
p
4a2   4a+ 25); 1
12
(7(2a  1) +
p
4a2   4a+ 25) < t (A.2)
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In order for both (A.1) and (A.2) to hold , we see that
1 < t <
1
12
(7(2a  1) 
p
4a2   4a+ 25), a > 7
4
;
t >
1
12
(7(2a  1) +
p
4a2   4a+ 25), a > 1 hold.
However, the rst inequality of the above is invalid since t  a + z > 1. Hence, the
lemma holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: From(18)and (24), qLD  qLN = 1
8
(3(a+ z) p(a+ z)2 + 8)  1
4
(a+ z 1) =
1
8
(t+ 2 pt2 + 8). (t+ 2)2   (pt2 + 8)2 = 4(t  1) > 0 for t > 1,where t = a+ z. From
(??) and (26), we see that the expected net prot at the LN andLD equilibrium can be
expressed as k(qk) = 1
4z
qk(z   bzk)2, k = LN;LD. We also see that dbzk
dqk
= 1 > 0 from
(4) and the symmetry of each rm output at the LND and LDN equilibria.@
t(qk)
@qk
=
1
4z

(z   bzk)2 + 2qk(z   bzk)@bzk
@qk

= 1
4z
 
(z   bzk)2 + 2qk(z   bzk)1 > 0; k = LN;LD form
(6) and (4). Hence the result follows from qLN > qLD.
Derivation of qLNDPS1
Solving (27) with respect to qLND1 , we obtain
qLND1 =
1
3
 
t  1  qLND2

(A.3)
Substituting ((A.3)) into (27) and rearranging it yields the quadratic equation of
qLND2 ,
1
9
f((2t+ 1)2   10(2t+ 1))qLND2 + 16(qLND2 )2   9g = 0.
Solving this equation, we get
qLND2 =
1
16
(5(2t+ 1) 3
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17).
Substituting this into ((A.3)) and rearranging it, we have
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qLND1 =
1
16
(2t  7
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17).
Since qLND1 > 0 for t > 1, however, we have
qLND1 =
1
16
(2t  7 +p4t2 + 4t+ 17) ,where t > 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3
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Proof: From the above equation and (4), (29) , (28) and (30), we have
bzLND =  (a  1 QLND) =  (E[pLND]  1) =  (a  1
8
(6t+ 7 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17)) < 0,
, a > 1
8
(6t+ 7 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17): (A.4)
Therefore, in order for bzLND to satisfy the assumption (5), we have bzLND to satisfy
(5)
z   bzLND = a+ z   1
8
(6t+ 7 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17)
=
1
8
(2t  7 +
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17) > 0 for t > 1 (A.4)
and
bzLND   ( z) = z + bzLND = z   a+ 1
8
(6t+ 7 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17)
=
1
8
(7(2t+ 1) 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17)  2a > 0;
, 1
16
(7(2t+ 1) 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17) > a (A.5)
In order to hold both of (A.4) and (A.5), a have to satisfy
1
16
(7(2t+ 1) p4t2 + 4t+ 17) > a > 1
8
(6t+ 7 p4t2 + 4t+ 17).18
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: qLND2  qLD = 58t  316
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17+ 5
16
  1
8
(3t pt2 + 8) = 1
8
(3t pt2 + 8) >
0 for t > 1, since (3t)2   (pt2 + 8)2 = 8 (t  1) (t+ 1) > 0 for t > 1. From propo-
sition 3, we have qLND2 > q
LND
1 for t > 1. We can show that q
LND
1   qLD = 18t +
1
16
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17   7
16
  1
8
(3t   pt2 + 8) = 1
16
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17   1
4
t + 1
8
p
t2 + 8   7
16
. Let
F (t) = 1
16
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17   1
4
t + 1
8
p
t2 + 8   7
16
. We see that F (1) = 0 and F 0(t) =
1
32
8t+4p
4t2+4t+17
+ 1
8
tp
t2+8
  1
4
= 1
8
t
p
4t+4t2+17+2t
p
t2+8 2pt2+8p4t+4t2+17+pt2+8p
t2+8
p
4t+4t2+17
. However, we
have F 0(1) =   2
15
< 0;
18We can easily show that 116 (7(2t+ 1) 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17) > 18 (6t+ 7 
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17) for 8t > 1:
32
F 00(t) = 1
4
p
4t2+4t+17
  1
64
(8t+4)2
(4t2+4t+17)
3
2
  1
8
t2
(t2+8)
3
2
+ 1
8
p
t2+8
=
(4t2+4t+17)
3
2+4(t2+8)
3
2
(t2+8)
3
2 (4t2+4t+17)
3
2
> 0;
limt!1 F 0(t) = limt!1 18
t
p
4t+4t2+17+2t
p
t2+8 2pt2+8p4t+4t2+17+pt2+8p
t2+8
p
4t+4t2+17
= limt!1 18
p
4=t+4+17=t2+2
p
1+8=t2 2
p
1+8=t2
p
4=t+4+17=t2+
p
1+8=t2=tp
1+8=t2
p
4=t+4+17=t2
= 2+2 22+0
12 = 0. So
we see that F (t) < 0; for t > 1.) qLND1 < qLD for t > 1. We can show that qLND2   qLN =
5
8
t   3
16
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17 + 5
16
  1
4
(t   1) = 3
8
t   3
16
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17 + 9
16
= 1
16
(6t + 9  
3
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17) > 0 for t > 1 since (6t + 9)2   (3p4t2 + 4t+ 17)2 = 72t   72 =
72 (t  1) > 0; for t > 1. Finally, we can see that qLND1  qLN = 18t+ 116
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17 
7
16
  1
4
(t  1) = 1
16
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17  1
8
t  3
16
= 1
16
(
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17  (2t+3)) < 0; for t > 1;
since (
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17)2   (2t + 3)2 = 8  8t =  8 (t  1) < 0. In consequent, we get
the result. 
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof: From (34), (28) and (29), we have QLND = QLDN = QLM = 3
4
t  
1
8
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17  1
8
= 1
8
(6t  1 p4t2 + 4t+ 17). So
from (34), (18) and the above, we can show that QLM QLN = 1
8
(6t 1 p4t2 + 4t+ 17) 
1
2
(t  1) = 1
4
t 1
8
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17+3
8
= 1
4
t 1
8
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17+3
8
= 1
8
(2t+3 p4t2 + 4t+ 17) >
0 for t > 1, since (2t+3)2 (4t2+4t+17) = (2t+ 3)2 4t 4t2 17 = 8t 8 = 8 (t  1) > 0
for t > 1.) QLM > QLN for t > 1. From (34), (24) the above, we have QLM   QLD =
1
8
(6t 1 p4t2 + 4t+ 17)  1
4
(3t pt2 + 8) = 1
4
p
t2 + 8  1
8
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17  1
8
= 1
4
p
t2 + 8 
1
8
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17  1
8
,and letH(t) = 1
4
p
t2 + 8  1
8
p
4t2 + 4t+ 17  1
8
. We see thatH(1) = 0,
H 0(t) = 1
4
tp
t2+8
  1
16
8t+4p
4t2+4t+17
=   1
4
p
t2+8
p
4t2+4t+17
 
2t
p
t2 + 8  tp4t2 + 4t+ 17 +pt2 + 8
< 0 since ((2t+1)
p
t2 + 8)2 (tp4t2 + 4t+ 17)2 = (2t+ 1)2 (t2 + 8) t2 (4t2 + 4t+ 17) =
16t2 + 32t + 8 > 0:Hence, H(t) < 0 for t > 1;) QLM < QLD. That is, we have shown
that QLN < QLM < QLD for t > 1.
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